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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

17 September 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for August 1985

1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:

Turkey: DECA Negotiations

Turkey may put forth tough initial demands this month as renegotiation of the Turkey-US Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement begins. The five-year agreement expires 18 December, and Ankara may expect that growing US problems with Greece will make the US concede to Turkish demands.

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Romania

Should Ceausescu's imminent surgery lead to such complications that instability or a succession struggle results, A/NIO/USSR believes the

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Soviets would strongly seek to influence events in Romania through various inducements and cajolery. NIO/Warning notes that Ceausescu's early departure and a succession struggle or other unstable situation would afford substantial opportunity for the Soviet Union to influence the succession.

Nicaragua

If insurgent forces maintain their current momentum, the Sandinistas are likely to respond with greater effort. This might well include a larger and more direct Cuban participation in direct combat with the insurgents.

Arab/Israeli West Bank Violence

All the ingredients are present for further spontaneous acts of violence by Palestinians against Israelis, and retaliatory violence by Israeli vigilantes against West Bank Palestinians. More radical Arab players like Syria will promote further violence and try to take advantage of it because of its obvious potential for disrupting the peace process. So far the weapons used in the Palestinian attacks have been unsophisticated--mostly knives. Evidence of more advanced weaponry such as plastic explosives would indicate more sophisticated organization and talent on the terrorists' part, and probably of foreign backing.

Pakistan

Martial law is scheduled to be lifted in January 1986, but the timetable could easily slip. Zia wants to string the process out. Other factors that could derail the lifting of martial law include: ethnic problems, further Shia disturbances, economic discontent generated from IMF austerity measures, and external factors such as greatly increased pressure from the USSR over Afghanistan or from India on the nuclear issue. Any of these factors could provide a pretext to extend martial law. Pakistan's nuclear weapons development, and India's reaction to it, continue to have the potential to skew virtually all issues of concern to the US. It is likely to come up in relation to requests for economic aid and military equipment, and it has the potential to complicate US policy toward Afghanistan.

Ethiopia

As fighting intensifies in the north--particularly in Eritrea--foreign nationals, including relief workers, will be at risk.

South Africa

Sporadic violence in the townships will continue, but unrest will remain containable by South African security forces. A terrorist

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[redacted]

ANC officials want to prove they can still operate effectively in South Africa even after the recent raid against their headquarters in Botswana. Regardless of whether the ANC reasserts itself, South African security forces almost certainly will strike against the organization's facilities in neighboring countries, probably in Lesotho.

Sudan

Tensions within the TMC are likely to worsen as the military fiasco in the south unfolds. The positions of several military leaders could be jeopardized as the TMC seeks to apportion blame for the disaster. The Government's appetite for new weaponry will increase, and Khartoum may turn to Libya or ask the Soviet Union for arms during the September visit of a Sudanese military delegation to Moscow. The chances of some dramatic Libyan action in Sudan--either instigation of a coup or a terrorist bombing against a US or Egyptian facility--remain high.

Uganda

The chances of political accommodation between the government and insurgent leader Museveni are slim. Museveni is likely to move militarily to take control of Kampala. This effort probably will succeed, but the insurgent forces will not be able to establish control over the north, guaranteeing continued instability and possible civil war. The security situation in Kampala could again deteriorate quickly and pose a danger to US personnel.

2. Trend Commentary:

USSR/East Europe

Gorbachev's hardline perspective on East Europe is geared to preserving the Eastern bloc, maintaining support for Soviet policies in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, fostering strict loyalty to the USSR, and improving the quality of East European products delivered to the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe is recoiling from this tough line--initially having anticipated more elbow room under Gorbachev--as Moscow continues to make more clear that it will not permit any new independence in East European foreign policies or economic heterodoxy.

PRC: Air Defenses

Over the next five years, Chinese efforts to improve their air defense capabilities will not be sufficient to alter significantly their vulnerability to Soviet air attack. By the mid-to-late 1990s, however, depending on the level and type of Western assistance, China could be in a position to make an air attack upon them very costly, thus providing a more effective deterrent.

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[redacted] In the short term, US firms may profit from the sale of military technology to China, but in-country production will remain Beijing's preferred, but slow, method for achieving air force improvements.

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Singapore

The Singaporean government may be underestimating the seriousness of the most dramatic economic recession in its history, which will make it reluctant to come to terms with the US on outstanding trade issues. The economic recession is not likely, however, to adversely affect Singapore's policy [redacted]

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Peru

The USSR intends to offer President Garcia more economic and military assistance at attractive terms, which Garcia most likely will accept--especially if payment can be made in durable goods rather than cash. To retain the support of the Peruvian military, Garcia is certain to purchase Soviet military equipment being offered at generous credit terms. The extent to which the Soviets will expand their influence in Peru is less clear, however, because Garcia realizes that to maintain his credibility internationally, he must keep his distance from the USSR. But as Peru's dire economic conditions mount, dependence on Soviet trade and credit terms may give Moscow more opportunities for leverage than Garcia anticipates.

Chile

President Pinochet's determination to ride out the current spate of demonstrations and bombings--aimed at pressuring Pinochet into relaxing his harsh policies and speeding civilian transition--is likely to provoke further radical violence. Terrorist bombings may increase. The Communists are increasingly committed to armed struggle against the government, but they do not represent a serious challenge to the security forces. Attacks on US-related facilities, however, are likely to increase. Pinochet may respond to continuing violence with reimposition of a state-of-seige, at which point some members of the military high command might begin to reexamine their support for the president.

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
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